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A TOPOLOGRAPHICAL APPROACH TO INFRASTRUCTURE. POLITICAL TOPOGRAPHY, 
TOPOLOGY AND THE PORT OF DAR ES SALAAM 
 
By Jana Hönke & Iván Cuesta-Fernández 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
Economic infrastructure hubs, such as ports, are crucial sites for exploring new political geographies. 
In such environments, mobilities are enabled and rigidly channelled premised on the stasis of the port-
as-checkpoint. Such nodes are part of an ever-growing political geography of zones that requires more 
attention. This article proposes a ‘topolographical’ approach – a combined heuristic drawing from 
political topography and topology – to comprehend more fully the transformations in the political 
geographies of large-scale infrastructures. The cardinal nature of the port of Dar es Salaam makes it 
a crucial site through which to illustrate the purchase of this framework. The topographical analysis 
puts forward the port of Dar as ‘archipelago of global territories’, within which heterogeneous actors 
claim graduated authority. Drawing on topology, the article shows what is folded into the port, 
constantly shaping not only who governs but, more importantly, how power and authority are exercised. 
It will be shown how imaginaries of the port - as gateway, seamless space, and modernity ‘from scratch’ 
- as much as new technological devices work to produce historically and geographically distinct 
political geographies, and indeed bring new ones into being. 
 
 
Introduction 
In February 2013 the President of Tanzania Jakaya Kikwete unveiled the Big Results Now 
(BRN) initiative.1 In addition to articulating a vision of Tanzania in 2025 professedly chiselled 
according to the ‘Malaysian Model of Development’,2 BRN defined transport as one of six key 
result areas. A roadmap for the transport sector followed, which largely reproduced the now 
dominant parlance amidst the Dar es Salaam port community and international donors. The 
                                                          
1 We wish to sincerely thank all the participants in interviews in Dar es Salaam, and in particular those who helped us 
contact additional members of the port community. The logistical assistance of the Port Manager as well as of TICTS is also 
gladly acknowledged. For comments on previous versions of the paper, we thank the discussants and participants of the New 
Political Topographies panel organised with Brenda Chalfin at the European Conference on African Studies 2015, panels at 
EISA and ISA 2015 and 2016, and the Politics of Circulation workshop in Copenhagen 2016. We are also grateful to the 
editors and three anonymous reviewers of Society & Space for their thoughtful comments. Special thanks go to the fantastic 
participants of the New Political Topographies. Trans-boundary Flows, Authority and Legitimation in Africa and Beyond 
conference in May 2015 in Edinburgh, where this paper started to take shape. This research was supported through a College 
of the Humanities and Social Sciences Challenge Investment grant, University of Edinburgh. 
2 See the Big Results Now website: http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/quick-menu/brn/ (accessed 30 March 2016) 
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roadmap considered efficiency and redrawing traffic flows as almost exact synonyms. 
Superposed to maps of the existing layout, red and orange-coloured arrows and lines heralded 
a new ‘single-flow system’ purportedly capable of reducing truck turnaround time from six to 
two hours, and shattering current barriers to freight flows (GoT 2013). In line with the World 
Bank funded ‘Maritime Gateway’ project for Dar es Salaam,3 these visions also aspire to 
overturn how security checks and weighbridge procedures were performed across far-reaching 
development corridors, thus making the presence of the port immediately ‘felt’ in operations 
carried out in distant places. Fresh topological imaginaries were thus projected into public 
discussion, which aspired to reformulate the purview of port operations. Embedded in the 
maps, also travelled topographical claims to spatial authority broadcast by the port 
bureaucracy.  
 
Such large-scale plans for infrastructure projects have proliferated in Africa and elsewhere in 
recent years. A massive ‘respacing‘(Engel and Nugent, 2010) is under way that however 
remains little understood. In order to address this, the article examines the port of Dar es 
Salaam, following Chalfin’s lead in the need to conduct research ‘wherever power in late-
modernity is concentrated and renewed yet works to hide itself’ (2010a: 4; Ferguson, 1990; 
Mitchell, 2002). The article interrogates the port as space that dispersed networks of production 
and consumption bring into being. Such nodes of infrastructure serve as pertinent empirical 
sites through which to learn more about new political geographies: as argued by Easterling 
(2014: 15), in the contemporary world, ‘some of the most radical changes to the globalizing 
world are being written, not in the language of law and diplomacy, but rather in the spatial 
formation of infrastructure’. These become particularly visible, and visible in new ways, in ex-
centric sites in Africa, in which the Western narrative of modernity is but one amongst others 
informing people’s ways of imagining and constructing the world (Comaroff and Comaroff, 
2012). 
 
This article suggests a combined methodology that draws from political topography and 
political topology to comprehend the transformation of political geographies of infrastructure 
hubs. To reinvigorate how we think about space, it has been disassociated from ideas of stasis 
                                                          
3 Complementing the broader vision of an East and Central African Corridor Project by the Infrastructure Consortium for 
Africa. See The World Bank (n.d.) Dar es Salaam Maritime Gateway Project. Available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P150496?lang=en (accessed 26 May 2016); The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 
(n.d.) Eastern and Central Transport Corridor. Available at http://www.icafrica.org/en/topics-programmes/eastern-and-
central-transport-corridors/ (accessed 26 May 2016). 
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and boundedness, and come to be understood as fluid, embracing relationality, heterogeneity 
and change (Massey 2005: 13). Yet while spatialities are ‘stories so far’ (2005: 9), venturing 
to the other extreme - in Massey’s words an ‘extravaganza of non-Euclidian, black-holey [..] 
previously topologically improbable evocations’ (2005: 13) - must be avoided. A productive 
approach, we suggest, is somewhere in between.   
 
The article illustrates the purchase of a combined, ‘topolographical’ methodology with regard 
to the political geography of the port of Dar es Salaam. Our topographical analysis puts forward 
the port as archipelago of global territories within which heterogeneous actors claim authority. 
Drawing on topology, the article shows what is folded into the port and shapes who governs, 
but also how power and authority are exercised, and from where, and the ways in which this 
has been made possible. Imaginaries – of the port as gateways and seamless space, and of 
modernity ‘from scratch’ - as much as new technological devices – international standards and 
electronic devices – work to produce historically and geographically distinct political 
geographies, and indeed bring new ones into being. 
 
To substantiate this argument, the article draws on the findings from interviews and participant 
observation with a variety of port stakeholders involved in clearing and transporting cargo from 
and to the port of Dar es Salaam, including the port authority. In addition, it builds upon a 
review of the narratives and claims to authority reflected in policy papers and expert reports 
produced by the port authority and international donors over the past five years until 2016, 
which are complemented with sources from Tanzanian newspapers. Fieldwork was carried out 
in the spring of 2015. 
 
The article first analyses existing literature on infrastructure investment and political spatiality, 
and then develops a heuristic lens drawing from both political topography and topology. The 
third section introduces the port of Dar, and the fourth one demonstrates the archipelago-like 
territoriality of the port and hybrid topography of regulation. The fifth section unfolds a 
topological analysis of Dar port that features three elements: Imaginaries of gateways, new 
technical devices, and Dubai-style modernity ‘from scratch’. The conclusion summarizes the 
argument and enumerates the benefits implied in drawing from political topography and 
topology to study the political spatialities of large-scale economic infrastructures. 
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New political geographies and nodes of infrastructure 
Transcontinental mobilities are premised on the stasis of ports. Growing mobility, such as the 
explosion of container shipping from the 1960s, depends on similarly growing ’multiple fixities 
or moorings often on a substantial physical scale that enable the fluidities of liquid modernity’ 
(Sheller and Urry, 2006: 210). As much as capital is not footless, but builds on offices, national 
affiliations, off-shore zones and ports, territoriality is not vanishing but remains crucial for 
enabling ‘globality’ for some, whilst foreclosing others (Elden, 2005; Jessop et al., 2008). 
Recent literature on enclaves and zones also indicates the continuing importance of political 
topography. It provides powerful tools for mapping processes of re-territorialisation, such as 
with offshore financial centres, technological zones of extraction and other ‘global territories’ 
(Opitz and Tellmann, 2012) such as ports. Some of these nodes have received attention within 
political geography and international relations (IR) for how they are linked to broader political 
projects (Barry, 2013; Hönke, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2007). With regard to ports, Chalfin posits 
that ’[i]n Africa, as elsewhere, ports are a telling indicator of the tenor of political power and 
the contests and shifting fortunes among ruling groups’ (2010b: 573). At times, large-scale 
infrastructure projects reify and reinforce state authority but supply chain security also 
decouples state borders from traditional state territory. Among others, such bordering operates 
through the creation of exceptional zones or ‘secure areas’ in which domestic laws and rights 
are mediated or suspended (Cowen, 2014: 81). Ports exemplify such zones and are thus crucial 
sites for exploring multifaceted transformations of power and authority. 
 
The challenge in analysing such zones is the proclivity to reproduce the idea that they are 
territories closed off from the local environment; an idea that has been prominent in the 
literature on enclaves (e.g. Ferguson, 2005). Oil and mining enclaves, according to this 
narrative, were closed off from the local population through the practices of security forces and 
ever more sophisticated security technology. However, even enclaves of extraction are very 
much connected to the world around them (Hönke, 2013). They host bubbles of governance 
characterised by a proliferation of transnational standards, technologies and professionals. 
Considerable work is indeed required to dis-embed them from their surroundings, and make 
their entanglements invisible (Appel, 2012). At the same time, enclaved spaces with graduated 
sovereignty (Ong 2006) have become a typical feature of postcolonial geographies. While 
narratives of political legitimation keep referencing the idea of an all-encompassing state, 
‘development’ is more and more enacted in transnationally connected and differentially 
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bounded zones (Sidaway 2007). For ports, such a mixture of dis-embedding and connecting is 
evident.  Thus an energetic and flexible approach to the political geography of economic 
infrastructure hubs is required. 
 
A ‘topolographical’ methodology 
With Massey (2005: 99-100), power-geometries are geometries of relations, the structuring of 
space through both flows and enclosure, through them being differentially empowering and 
disempowering. Together, flows and enclosures create proximity and distance, distances that 
are not necessarily visible in terms of metrics but may also be imagined, or felt. Two distinct 
traditions have tended to treat one or the other: political topography has tended to focus on the 
production and maintenance of enclosure, whilst political topology has leaned towards flows 
and processes of becoming.4 Of course, enclosures are produced, and territory is an effect of 
networked socio-technical practices (Painter 2010). Thus the two traditions are not mutually 
exclusive and our point is not an ontological one about whether topology and topography are 
distinct, or the latter a subtype of the former.5 Our point here is methodological. We suggest 
that a fruitful way for empirically grasping the changing political geometries (Massey) of 
infrastructure hubs is to draw together insights from both traditions.  
This is crucial to counter the tendency to salute diminished territorial powers and expanding 
flows as if they were paving the way for universal rights and mobility instead of paying 
attention to forms of power and authority that operate through global technologies and practices 
of logistics. Instead of celebrating fragility and ever more opportunities for change as such, it 
is also important to capture the moorings on which these very flows rely. While infrastructures 
of logistics encapsulate the epitome of contemporary ideas of mobility, we must detect 
topological and topographical technologies of security and human labour exploitation from 
Dubai to Dar. 
 
This section therefore reviews the respective methodological strengths of political topography 
and topology, and retrieves a ‘topolographical’ heuristic drawing from both. Ports make visible 
the reconfiguration of surface space including processes through which bounded space, and 
                                                          
4 For a critique of this tendency to dichotomy, see Martin and Secor (2014). 
5 It has recently been suggestd to understand topography as a particular dimension of topology: that of Euclidean 
geometry (Martin and Secor 2014) and the “numbers, distribution, movements, and connections across [such] 
Euclidean surface space” (MacFarlane 2016). 
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claims to authority over it, serve as political technology (Sack 1986; Painter 2010). Political 
topography has a lot to offer here as it asks how power maps onto physical space, tracing the 
imprint of claims to authority in physical space. A topological sensibility has shed light more 
on how relations of proximity and distance, disconnected from measurable distance, shape 
infrastructure as they are put into play politically.  
 
In the past though, topography and topology have been pitted against one another (Paasi, 2011). 
Emboldened by the fact that territoriality has endured as a crucial governmental technology, 
’topographists’ have defended the merit of long-held views concerning authority over physical 
space (Mann, 1984; Peet, 2007). ’Topologists’, in response, argued that globalization is 
relentlessly re-configuring power within and beyond territories and metric distance (Allen, 
2009, 2011; Jones and Jessop, 2010). Fixity versus mobility, absolute versus relative space: the 
opposition of these pairs has overdrawn the supposed binary between the two.  
 
More recently, the dust from the controversy has begun to settle (Elden, 2011; Harvey, 2012; 
Prince 2016). While drawing on a topological understanding of power, it remains important 
not to move from a ‘territorial trap’ into a ’non-territorial’ one (Jones, 2009; Opitz and 
Tellmann, 2012: 264). Making things global by making them move through ports is subject to 
territorial constraints as much as topological forces (Allen, 2009: 197–198). Nodes of 
infrastructure are hence ‘site[s] of intersection between networked topologies and territorial 
legacies’ (Massey, 2005: 102) in which the distant and the proximate; the virtual and the 
material; flow and fixity; are folded together.  
 
It is therefore worthwhile to extract the tools that the literatures on political topography and 
topology offer to grasp these multiple spatialities. In work on political topography, power 
usually has ‘location and extension […] and supposes physical distances which consist of 
measurable spans of the globe […], and who […] is capable of controlling such distances’ 
(Allen, 2011: 284). With regards to location, political topography is interested in the expression 
of power and authority in physical space and how a particular spatiality of power, such as 
territory, is produced (Boone, 2003). Topographical maps place vegetation, settlements, 
infrastructure in two-dimensional space, and provide the metric distance between these 
elements. Political topographies, in turn, capture power relations as projected over physical 
space.  
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Surveying authority over surface space, political topography has thus been concerned with the 
study of the whereabouts of power, in and around singular sites and with its extension and 
gradient across regions. Accordingly, work on political topography has aspired to read relations 
of power, and shifts in these relations, from physical barriers, buildings and legal, political and 
social practice in space (e.g. Sassen, 2006). It has also expanded to ‘spatialise’ how and where 
power operates within states, including power relationships between the centre and periphery, 
and their singular trajectories in response to local factors (Boone, 2003; Ferguson and Gupta, 
2002; Hönke, 2010). Political topographies also map networks and flows; a topography of 
expert knowledge for instance places research institutions and epistemic communities on a 
traditional map.  
 
Political topography has thus much to offer for studying infrastructure hubs such as ports. The 
tools we draw from it are, first, to include the study of representations of physical boundaries 
as viewed by planners and governors, and to trace claims to authority over (parts of) the port. 
To trace such representations, the collection and analysis of policy documents, maps and 
regulatory texts is required. This should be complemented and contrasted with the tracing of 
objects, and analysis of symbols of claims to authority placed on surface space, and an 
interpretation of everyday practices of governing in physical space.   
 
Nevertheless, political topography has limitations that impoverish the study of spatialities of 
power. Linked to an underlying idea of compartmentalised, territorial zones of authority, 
political topographies have a tendency to focus on particular products of space making, and the 
strategies of such fixing (Jones, 2009). However, contemporary practices of security, for 
instance, extend border management ‘outward into the ports of foreign states […and] inward 
along domestic transport networks’ (Cowen, 2014: 81). Furthermore, variation in policy 
changes cannot be understood without the stretching and folding of near and far: of what is 
made present and what is kept at a distance or excluded from debate (Prince, 2016). This point 
is crucial for students of infrastructure space, as the contemporary folding and stretching of 
state borders works in ways topography alone has difficulties in fully grasping. 
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Work on political topology stresses how relations make up and endlessly reconstitute space. 
Importantly, political topology goes beyond ‘the metrics of size, distance and length’ (Allen, 
2016: 8) and draws attention to who and which ideas extend influence, unrelated to physical 
closeness. Indeed, who creates and shapes space is often independent from proximity and 
distance in a Eucledian sense, as we will discuss below with regard to port rankings and the 
powerful idea of the ‘Dubai model’ in Tanzanian port reforms. Such an approach is also helpful 
for thinking space as made up of ‘intensive relationships which create the distances between 
powerful and not so powerful actors’ (Allen, 2011: 284; also Massey 2005).  
 
In this regard, it becomes crucial to trace processes of ‘presencing’ (Prince, 2016: 4), and thus 
processes that construct proximity. Publics might for instance be mobilised in a way that brings 
an issue and a locality close to people who are physically thousands of miles away. Similarly, 
the possibilities for political action are constituted not only by those ‘in a place’ but by 
discourses, technologies and other practices (of lean production, efficiency and seamless space) 
circulating across boundaries. We advance a focus on two specific processes in particular.  
 
The first concerns the imaginaries attached to, and generated by, nodes of infrastructure, which 
render distant objects closer or farther. Infrastructures do not only perform technical functions; 
they also generate visions and evoke desire (Larkin, 2013). There is a long tradition of using 
large-scale infrastructures to represent state power to its citizens (Chalfin, 2010b; 
Swyngedouw, 2007). As the anthropology of the state has shown, roads, dams and massive 
buildings enact ‘the state’ (Larkin, 2013). The seductions of modern futures that they 
encapsulate work powerfully when a slum dweller in Kinshasa, whose home was brutally 
removed from the site for new buildings, states ‘Yes, we’ll be the victims […] but still it will 
be beautiful’ (De Boeck, 2011: 278). But powerful imaginaries can of course work in different 
ways. In fact, more and more  political projects are advanced today by invoking less state-
focussed and rather  ‘topological imaginations’(Marres, 2012). Such imaginations share 
commitments to ideas of flows, ‘virtual space’ and ‘social networks’ but often do not commit 
to openness and change inherent within many topological theories of the social (ibid). In any 
case, appreciation may well be disconnected from functionality. Debate surrounding the port 
of Dar es Salaam hints as to how infrastructure comes to represent ‘the possibility of being 
modern, of having a future, or the foreclosing of that possibility’ (Larkin, 2013: 333; Sneath et 
al., 2009). In terms of methods, such meanings can be read from official texts as well as from 
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the everyday sayings and doings of technocrats and practitioners who build, work at and use 
infrastructure. 
 
The second process refers to mobilizing the agency of technology and infrastructure. Literature 
on political topography treats things in space as representative of claims to authority – whether 
by the state or other actors. This is limited as infrastructure also does something. It makes up 
space, opening up possibilities while making other courses of action less likely. As Mackenzie 
(2006: 12) has shown, models and technical devices do not simply describe and help operate 
the economy – transport through ports in our case -, they are ’engine[s]’: an ’active force 
transforming its environment, not a camera passively recording it’. They draw actors into 
specific ways of understanding the world and acting in it (Easterling, 2014). Benchmarkings 
and rankings are one such technology that draws sites closer, or apart, in ways that do not 
correspond to their physical proximity. They are a device to make distant concerns felt in 
Tanzania, and in Dar for that matter, by placing the port of Dar in a virtual comparative relation 
with other sites elsewhere (Larner and Le Heron, 2002; Prince, 2016). According to Barry, 
technologies of compatibility and harmonization form a space of their own - made up of 
common measurements, integrated systems of production and common regulatory and quality 
standards (Barry, 2006: 240) - invisible through a topographical lens. The idea of 
‘technological zones’ he advances is helpful to grasp the political geography of Dar port.  
 
Similar to imaginaries, technical devices shed light on the relations mobilized around 
infrastructure hubs that construct inclusion and exclusion in specific ways. Both transform 
experiences of proximity and distance, of accelerated speed but also of new forms of exclusion. 
They embody politics by making issues visible, creating necessities and ascribing authority in 
new ways. Such processes do not imply that powerful machines operate for the market and 
against the state. Rather, as Louise Amoore has argued in the context of the ‘War on Terror’, 
computational models and other technology often coproduce and authorise sovereign acts with 
and for states (Amoore 2013).  
 
To summarize this section, a topological stance on socio-spatial relations is crucial for 
understanding the political geographies of infrastructure hubs. But to embrace the idea that our 
world is made up of relations and hence more fluid and open to constant change than 
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traditionally assumed does not imply to ‘replace topography […] with a topological theory of 
space, place and politics as encounter, performed and fluid’ (Jones, 2009: 492). As argued 
above, flows and bounded space are both historically specific products of relations. They co-
evolve. Ports are an excellent illustration of how flows and movement remain constrained by 
historically inherited spatial fixes and new territorialising strategies, which at the same time 
provide the conditions that enable them. Political spatialities are ‘stories so far’, yet there are 
strategies of fixing space or making things move, and their products, that can be traced however 
unstable and open to change these might be. To do so, a ‘topolographical’ methodology that 
draws from the rich tradition of political topography and political topology, is best attuned to 
capture changing political spatialities of infrastructural nodes. The port of Dar es Salaam will 
serve to explore the political geography of a maritime infrastructure hub based on the above.  
 
The re-emergence of infrastructure investment in Africa and the port of Dar es Salaam 
African infrastructure, and ports in particular, are back on the international agenda,6 as 
forcefully as in the high times of modernisation theory in the 1950s and 60s. Over the past 30 
years, the scale and integration of the shipping and logistics industry has increased 
substantially, with economic financialization and deregulation further easing transoceanic trade 
and transforming ports, and containers spearheading a revolution in transport (Levinson, 2006). 
In addition, a new international agenda around infrastructure is built on the vision that more 
physical infrastructure spurs economic growth, by integrating the continent both internally as 
well as into the global economy (Calderón, 2009). The 24th summit of the African Union 
discussed infrastructure as one of three major themes, underscoring the extent to which this 
vision has been embraced by African governments (AU, African Union, 2015). In Tanzania, 
several port projects are under way. One is the refurbishment of the port of Dar es Salaam, 
jointly funded by the World Bank, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) 
and TradeMark East Africa (USD 565-596 million – sources differ as to the exact figure).7 
 
The port of Dar es Salaam is one of the largest ports in sub-Saharan Africa. Both the German 
and the British favoured Dar es Salaam, which soon outpaced what had hitherto been the main 
                                                          
6 See for example the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, http://www.icafrica.org/en/. Also Ford (2006).  
7 The World Bank (2014) Tanzania today signed a memorandum of understanding with a coalition of development partners 
to develop Dar es Salaam port. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/09/12/memorandum-of-
understanding-coalition-of-development-partners-dar-es-salaam-port (accessed 27 May, 2016). 
11 
 
port, Bagamoyo.8 Thereafter, under British rule, cargo handling swelled from 1938 to 1956 
(Hance and Van Dongen, 1958), whilst after independence in 1961 cargo throughput increased 
fourfold in the decade ending in1975 (Hoyle, 1978). The decades of structural adjustment and 
economic recovery brought a period of uncertainty for the port, as well as tighter competition 
from neighbouring seaports. The latter is stressed in the more recent, dominant narrative about 
Dar es Salaam port. This account portrays the port in relentless competition with Mombasa for 
the status of main gateway to East Africa (Wood, 2004). The portrait is misleading, however, 
as even though Dar es Salaam continues to handle approximately 90% of Tanzania’s 
international trade, only 30 percent of it corresponds with trans-shipment cargo to and from 
Zambia, Malawi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Rwanda (AfDB, 
African Development Bank, 2010). In addition, this dominant narrative underlines congestion. 
To do so, it draws heavily on oft-quoted official figures showing that throughput has recently 
increased by 10 percent annually, and that containerized imports and total throughput have 
equally skyrocketed, exceeding the estimated capacity of the port to handle Twenty Foot 
Equivalent Units (TEUs) by 30 percent (Shkaratan, 2012; TPA, 2014; World Bank, 2013, 
2014). 
  
The cardinal nature of the port of Dar es Salaam as logistical hub of the city itself, of Tanzania 
and of the broader region makes it a crucial site through which to observe new political 
geographies as they emerge around such infrastructure hubs.  
 
 
Multiple claims to authority in an expanding archipelago of territories 
Until the early 2000s, Dar port was run by the Tanzanian Port Authority (TPA). Under state 
ownership and management, the port physical layout had changed very little, despite recurrent 
donor-funded investments from the late 1950s to the early 1990s. With only minor alterations, 
in the 2000s port boundaries still remained circumscribed to the location designated by German 
colonial administrators in the Kurasini Ward, to the south of the Central Business District. 
While the port did not undergo any major regeneration, that was not the case for the city of Dar 
es Salaam. Its unplanned geographical expansion – today stretching over 1,800 square 
kilometres – gradually encircled the port with residential, commercial and, to a lesser extent, 
industrial areas. 
                                                          
8 For the politics around shifting the main colonial port away from Bagamoyo to Dar, see Fabian (2007). 
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From the late 1990s onwards, however, the port of Dar es Salaam became shorthand, in the 
words of policymakers and donors, for bottlenecks and congestion. According to experts’ 
reports and the media, the port had turned into a vast ‘storage area’; this internal congestion 
engulfed nearby roads, rendering them massive bottlenecks that asphyxiated cargo flows. It 
was in 2006 that the government conceived the first expansion of the port: an expansion of the 
Oil Jetty over Kurasini that involved the resettlement of 36,000 residents (Ndezi, 2009). More 
recently, the port encroached into the urban fabric and metamorphosed internally, with parts of 
it handed over to private management. Congestion coupled with the ideal of the ‘port-as-
gateway’ (see more detailed discussion below) instigated port territorialities to mutate along 
two lines throughout the 2000s. Firstly, the port logistical area expanded over nearby quarters 
through a patchwork of Inland Container Depots (ICDs). Secondly, the privatization of parts 
of the port transformed its layout and re-articulated authority over circulation.  
 
First, TPA adopted the idea of ICDs from more industrialized port cities in order to expand 
storage capacity and ease clearance procedures. The creation of ICDs added to an array of ever-
increasing port-related logistical satellites that came to colonize spaces beyond the port gates. 
Firstly, across the port road, existing container warehouses were expanded and new ones 
inaugurated; secondly, towards the southeast, oil storage facilities swelled; thirdly, about a 
dozen ICDs gradually opened. Thereby, ICDs came into existence in the latter half of the 2000s, 
premised upon the rationale of alleviating storage constraints within the port by transferring a 
proportion of the incoming containers and vehicles to mostly privately managed facilities until 
clearance. Still, revenue authorities perform in situ clearance procedures; and routine or 
impromptu verifications of quality, and weights and measures, amongst others, are carried out 
here by other governmental agencies. Progressive drops in dwell time animated the government 
to gradually license more ICDs to private logistical operators, up to the present stock of about 
a dozen such depots. Scattered over a radius of twelve kilometres, ICDs established themselves 
principally along the road to the airport and Ubungo, whilst some preferred the vicinities of 
Dar’s main Export Processing Zone. In so doing, ICDs outlined an ‘archipelago’ of 
commercially run, state-supervised logistical facilities. This archipelago not only redefined the 
boundaries of the port, but also rearticulated its economic and political geography by means of 
renewed relations premised upon proximity to the port – metric and social in terms of relations 
with port authorities.  On the latter, in the eyes of some consignees, ICDs brought about 
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collusive business relations between private owners and top officials in TPA, who secured 
protection and more activity to certain ICDs.9  
  
In addition, the expansion of ICDs and other satellite activities re-invoked a territorial exercise 
of authority in its most classical and indeed repressive sense. Territoriality is a modern political 
technology that comes with the sovereign exercise of force (Sack 1986) in order to police 
access to the port or port-related facilities. When the expansion of port-related activities 
encroached upon areas in the vicinities of the port, several communities were displaced from 
their neighbourhoods. When in 2009 the government launched an expansion of the Kurasini 
Oil Jetty, for example, it led to the resettlement of more than 36,000 people from the Kurasini 
ward (Ndezi, 2009). Crucially, territory as a technology of exerting political authority is not 
necessarily restricted to state authority. In the case of the ICDs, the splitting of handling and 
storage operations between state and commercial operators mutated the exercise of territoriality 
from a state-centred to an enmeshed public-private arrangement in which public authority 
became re-envisioned as operating through commercial tools and expertise.10  
 
Secondly, in the early 2000s cargo and container operations were split into two terminals, and 
the container terminal was handed over to a private operator, Tanzania International Container 
Terminal Services Ltd (TICTS). TICTS is a joint venture between world-leading port operator 
Hutchison Port Holdings of Hong Kong and a Tanzanian business group. Hence, TICTS started 
to handle exclusively the containerized cargo mooring in berths 8 to 11, as well as utilizing the 
largest section of the container yard for temporary storage. This change expressed a shift not 
only in who wields authority, but also in what authority is ascribed to. Privatization was 
anticipated to increase the efficiency of the port and transform it into a more profitability 
venture. 
 
It could be argued that, with the new public-private arrangement, the TPA saw its role diminish 
as the operation of the container terminal was outsourced. In contrast to fully privatized models, 
however, the Tanzania Port Authority retained the operation of the remaining berths and, in 
accordance with its handling of bulk cargo, most sheds and warehouses providing storage 
                                                          
9 Anonymous Consignee (2016). Interview 28 April, Dar es Salaam. 
10 This shift has not been without frictions and contestation. People refused to resettle, and within the port archipelago, petty 
sovereigns  - state and non-state, and from various agencies – struggle over power and authority. It will require another 
article to expand on these processes.   
14 
 
capacity for non-containerized cargo remained under their administration. Furthermore, 
Tanzania adopted a ‘landlord’ port model so that state agencies retained a wealth of regulatory 
capacities within the port premises across both terminals. The Tanzania Revenue Authority 
(TRA) retained its core jurisdiction over taxation of trade activities. In particular, it remains 
the sole agency allowed to authorize the displacement of containers, or bulk cargo, inside 
and/or outside the port. Other state agencies perform a variety of controls that may also alter 
traffic flows. A diminishment of state power is thus not the outcome of these transformations, 
as some critics of privatization might have it. Rather, ideas and practices of how the port should 
be run changed and became rearticulated in transnational ‘modes of government’ through 
devolution of practices to companies, individuals and other intermediaries (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002: 989-90; also Ong 2006). On the one hand, it is ‘the state’ itself that is made through 
such transnational practices, and indeed domestic elites use them to (re)produce the state in 
new ways (ibid., also Mitchell 2002). On the other, "transnational apparatuses of 
governmentality […] overlay[…] and coexist[…] with older, nation-state based modes of 
governance (ibid.: 994). 
 
Through the lens of political topography, another transformation of authority comes to light – 
the evolving transnational relations of public agents. Thus, for instance, the establishment of 
the Fair Competition Commission (FCC) installed a new mediator between multinational 
corporations and the port authorities. Attempts on the part of the FCC to enforce anti-
counterfeit regulations anchored locally the efforts of multinationals such as Samsung, Phillips 
and Unilever to protect their high value trade across transnational routes and market places. 
Whilst therefore, engineers and representatives from these multinational companies need only 
descend upon Tanzania once every three months, through the FCC’s mediation they oversee 
their interests in the Tanzanian market from a distance. As Sidaway (2007) supposed, transport 
hubs such as ports can indeed “be read as spaces of sovereign graduation”.  
 
This is further supported by the continued relationship of port-related authorities with the 
European Commission, the World Bank and DFID. In particular, the World Bank and DFID - 
through the multi-donor funded TradeMark East Africa – footed the USD 565 million bill for 
the refurbishment of Dar port and its vicinities. The project, launched in 2015, aims to reduce 
ship turnaround and container dwell time to increase throughput (World Bank, 2014). In 
addition to material resource, international donors provide the intellectual justification for such 
agenda, in accordance with the “Big Results Now” narrative. This initiative was inspired by 
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the ‘Malaysian Development Model’ and has been implemented since 2013 to deliver 
quantifiable policy outcomes in six priority areas. Predicated upon the trinity of trade, 
investment and poverty reduction, this ‘theory of change’ anticipates increased physical access 
to markets, an enhanced trade environment and improved business competitiveness.11 The 
external actors’ ideological proximity finds a parallel in the physical closeness of their offices 
situated in the business district of Dar. 
 
The above topographical analysis of the changing political geographies of Dar port focused on 
the physical outlet of the port as well as the way in which relations of political authority are re-
articulated, and exerted differently by various actors. A new archipelago of territorialities has 
taken shape where previously the port existed alone, and is managed by a heterogeneous set of 
actors with distinct, graduated (Ong 2006) claims to authority over particular issue areas and 
spaces. The Dar hub for maritime transport extended ever further into the urban fabric, thereby 
dislodging people to make space for further throughput of goods. Inspired by global logistical 
discourses and technologies, authorities framed such an endeavour under a nascent topological 
imagination of the port as globally connected, ‘seamless’ space. The changes in the port’s 
surface space and political topography, therefore, need to be understood in this context: the 
shift from ’port-as-checkpoint’ to ‘port-as-gateway’. Some of the most powerful 
transformations of political geography are not traceable through a focus on changes in 
Eucledian space or claims to formal authority over it as drawn from the literature on political 
topography.   
 
Gateway imaginaries, technological zones and modernity ‘from scratch’ 
 
In recasting the port of Dar es Salaam from port-as-checkpoint to gateway, port stakeholders 
enact both visions of circulation and flow and (re)produce zones that together perform seamless 
space. Power topologies afford the substrate that coproduce and legitimize transformations of 
port geographies. This will be illustrated in the three following subsections. The first revolves 
around ‘gateways’ and ‘seamless space’ as discursive tropes, and benchmarking as technology 
that situates the port against a network of regional port facilities. The second shows how 
standards and technical devices further bridge historical difference in order to render Dar port 
                                                          
11 According to TradeMark East Africa’s website: https://www.trademarkea.com (accessed 27 May, 2016). 
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a smooth part of a transcontinental technological zone. The third part demonstrates how the 
gateway ideal in Tanzania comes wrapped in new notions of modernity that weave imagery of 
a Dubai-style exuberant development into the standardized efficiency of global capitalism 
pitching reform of the old Dar port against a project of building a new port altogether.  
 
In tagging the three processes as topological, we do not wish to downplay their close 
entanglement with the described topographical ideas and practices. The very argument is that 
metric relations of power, proximity and distance co-evolve with non-Eucledian relations, and 
that methodologically drawing from political topography and topology is most fruitful to 
understand the multiple and changing spatialities of the port of Dar es Salaam.  
 
From port-as-checkpoint to ‘gateway’ and ‘seam-space’ 
The idea of ports as gateways establishes the port as a ‘somewhere’ that is not about boundaries 
but movement and connections: a paramount link in a chain binding sea and land, facilitating 
the flow of goods through transport corridors. Yet at the same time, ports are critical nodes of 
infrastructure that, as much as they enable connectivity, also allow multiple actors to control 
these global connections with a territorial logic. This double function is expressed in a project 
based on what Marres (2012) refers to as topological imaginaries: to transform the port of Dar 
from an enclave to a “territorial gateway” (TPA, 2016a; World Bank, 2014). 
 
In the early 2000s, figures for dwell time in the port of Dar es Salaam steadily increased due to 
the concern of port authorities with pilferage and corruption, which led, in turn, to focus on 
clearing procedures.12 Rising warehousing costs and a leisurely grace period – 14 days for 
domestic cargo - had turned the port of Dar into a huge storing area, thus defeating the purpose 
of a transit facility. Yet such insistence also permeated that port authorities saw the port as a 
checkpoint rather than one link along a chain of logistical infrastructure. Every link in the chain 
– the road linking the port to the ICDs, transhipment facilities, weighbridges, and checkpoints 
– thus constituted a bottleneck, potential or actualized; or, in the grammar of port stakeholders, 
a source of 'congestion' or a ‘thin pipe.’13  
 
                                                          
12 Mwanyange, J (2008) TRA cracks down on fake import papers. The East African, 23 June, 2008. Available at 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/440644/-/s3sb5vz/-/index.html (accessed 27 May 2016). 
13 Anonymous Logistical Operator (2015). Interview 27 April 
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Yet ideas about the port changed over time. References began to appear in policy documents 
culminating in the 2016 port handbook, which included: ‘new gateways to the hinterland’; or 
as ‘the Indian Ocean terminus of a complex logistics network stretching across much of Central 
Africa’ (TPA, 2016b: 3, 9). Reference to other ports such as Mombasa became crucial in this 
process. Senior ministerial officers, authorities sitting in the port and donors increasingly pitted 
the underperformance of Dar es Salaam against that of Mombasa, and vice versa, as a means 
to legitimize additional spatial interventions.  
 
These observations reflect a second facet of the transition from port-as-checkpoint to gateway 
wedded to region building: imaginaries of regional closeness and benchmarking drew Dar’s 
neighbours closer. Such ‘presencing’ (Prince, 2016) supported reforms towards further 
integration. In its most physical manifestation, this transition envisaged reinforcing two trade 
arteries: the Central Corridor (from Dar es Salaam to Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC), as well 
as the Southern Corridor (Dar es Salaam to Zambia). In a less physical sense, such 
reinforcement aimed to reduce the time it takes a container to reach Rwanda, Burundi, the 
DRC, Zambia and Malawi from Dar es Salaam. Symbolically, this project compounded the 
heightening in visibility of the geographical chain binding the port with final destinations.  
 
In Dar, such heightening and presencing occurs by means of an array of initiatives. First, the 
documents produced by port authorities and donors reproduce ad nauseam selectively picked 
indicators of port performance, notably dwell time and the average time or cost required to 
transport a container from the port to Rwanda, and compare them with the same metrics for 
Mombasa. Port authorities, clearing agents and transporters indeed speak of distances to 
Rwanda in days, not in kilometres, exemplifying how they quantify seamlessness in dwell 
time.14 Also, international actors such as Trademark East Africa and the Central Corridor 
Transport Observatory enact benchmarking exercises to assess the efficiency of the port – 
benchmarks that render the port of Dar es Salaam comparable (TMEA, TradeMark East Africa 
and CCTTFA, Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Authority, 2014). Benchmarking 
exercises, as those undertaken in the reports of the World Bank, TradeMark East Africa, and 
the CCTTFA, are crucial to rendering logistical infrastructures comparable and, thus, suitable 
for common regulatory standards (Barry, 2006), as will be detailed in the next section. Second, 
                                                          
14 Central Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Authority (n.d.). Inland Container Deports. Available at 
http://centralcorridor-ttfa.org/infrastructure/inland-container-deports/ (accessed 26 May 2016). 
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in their discourses port stakeholders invariably deprecate the roadblocks, weighbridges and 
other facilities along the way to other east African destinations. In their views, each roadblock 
removed equates a victory against the plague of congestion.  
 
What is invoked, therefore, is the port as part of a seamless space. The gateway metaphor 
speaks of seamless flows through the port and related corridors, with such seamlessness 
measured in dwell time metrics. In that sense, ‘drawing closer’ does not topographically shrink 
distances measured in kilometres, but instead topologically compresses space. However, as 
noted by Marres (2012), topological visions might bring about such effects in the first place.  
 
Technological zones and the power of technical devices 
A second element of the political topology of ports are the laws of logistics and related 
technologies have come to govern many of the flows moved by ship (Cowen 2014), and 
subsequently through Dar port. Dar, as imagined by port authorities and donors alike, 
resembles other major ports worldwide, whereby ensuring that traffic functions ‘seamlessly’ 
comes with new information systems to shorten waiting times and to ‘secure’ traffic in specific 
ways.  
 
In particular, a new e-customs technology was introduced at Dar port. The Tanzanian Revenue 
Authority launched the Tanzania Customs Integrated System (TANCIS) in 2014, ‘built on hi-
tech principles with a view to increasing effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and reliability 
in the Customs administration’.15 TANCIS follows similar systems introduced in Hong Kong 
(1986), Singapore (1989-1991), Malaysia (1996-2004), Ghana (2001) and Nigeria (2009). 
Kenya also joined in 2015. Crucially, TANCIS has since substituted physical encounters 
between tax officials and clearing agents in favour of electronic procedures to handle Pre-
Arrival Declarations. The new technical device powerfully transformed who controls, or may 
interfere for that matter, with flows of cargo, further integrating Dar port into a ‘global’ 
gateway infrastructure. The new technology also made it possible to dispense of cashmen and 
messengers who previously roamed around the city and port. However, it did not fully supplant 
previous practice, with some handling still carried out on paper. This facilitated tax agents to 
                                                          
15 Tanzania Revenue Authority (n.d.). What is TANCIS? Available at http://www.tra.go.tz/index.php/faqs/405-what-is-
tancis (accessed 26 May 2016). 
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switch from virtual to physical environment at their convenience and thus retain a more 
autonomous margin for manoeuvre in governing port activities.16 This technological zone is 
thus characterised by substantial frictions. Nevertheless, it is a bounded space governed and 
defined by technical standards and harmonized technology, not physical boundaries (Barry 
2006). Indeed, globalized production, supply chains and logistics systems generate 
transformations of the conception of border.  
 
However, while ‘seam space’ is (re)produced by international standards and technology, which 
include electronic biometric technologies (Cowen, 2010: 606) and e-customs systems, 
technologies are important in producing territoriality as still an important mode of governing 
global flows (Opitz and Tellman 2012). The port authority of Dar es Salaam, with the assistance 
of the World Bank, installed 465 closed-circuit television sets, and purchased patrol boats and 
vehicles. It commissioned an Integrated Security System in 2015, introducing electronic 
security cards for secure access to facilities, and endorsed the use of scanners at the entrance 
gates (TPA, 2016b). Displayed within security signs at each gate is that ‘[t]he port is ISPS 
Code compliant’, ISPS referring to the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, 
which applies to 20,000 ports worldwide.17 Annual inspections by external auditors ensure 
compliance. In reality, there are of course persistent holes in the security arrangements. When 
it comes to officers policing port gates, and as explained by the Acting Port Manager: ‘the 
decision that who should be allowed, who should not be allowed depends on the person there. 
He’s the final decider […] so […] it’s not a control per se, because it depends on how do you 
persuade him.’18 Nevertheless, bringing the port ‘up to international standards’ and related 
technologies are powerful devices that shape the port’s political geography.  
 
What TANCIS and international security standards reveal, therefore, is not so much the 
resilience of shady settlements, but rather the association of the port, and of port authorities, 
with a conundrum of technologies, software and equipment that make up a transboundary 
technological zone. Within it, it becomes possible to connect to, but also to assess and contrast 
                                                          
16 Anonymous Freight Forwarder (2015) Interview 14 April, Dar es Salaam; also Masasi, J (2015) Interview 27 April, Dar es 
Salaam. 
17 International Maritime Organization (n.d.). Solas XI-2 and the ISPS Code. Available at 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx 
(accessed 27 May, 2016). 
18 Mhanga, H. (2015). Interview 28 April, Dar es Salaam. 
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Dar with other ports worldwide. Far from being merely a-political technical devices, the notion 
of the technological zone captures more invisible connections and enclosures that channel 
flows through Dar and the broader east African region.  
 
Topologies of anticipation and modernity ‘from scratch’: bringing Dubai to Bagamoyo 
A final, striking feature of Dar port topology is that debates around Tanzanian ports 
reinvigorate imaginaries of modernity that are as prevalent as in the 1960s. Consequently, 
discourses broadcast by port authorities and donors about the port of Dar frequently pit notions 
of old, congested or unfit structures against the anticipated possibilities of new facilities to be 
built from scratch. This is visible in representations of the port terminals as old and backwards 
versus new, but more crucially in the debate over increasing efficiency of Dar port versus 
constructing a new mega-port at Bagamoyo.  
 
Especially the latter illustrates how infrastructure comes to represent ‘the possibility of being 
modern, of having a future, or the foreclosing of that possibility’ (Larkin, 2013: 333). The 
mega-port project was presented by the Kikwete government as making the Tanzanian state a 
‘gateway’ to modernity.19 The modernity envisioned here no longer follows Western models 
though but the archetype of new special zones of development. Dubai (see also Sidaway 2007). 
The Bagamoyo port project was originally conceived of as relatively small two-berth, USD 
225 million port in the mid-2000s. By 2009, however, it had expanded into a USD 680 million 
facility (TPA, 2009) and by 2013 a USD 10 billion brand new port, funded by China and Oman, 
with a capacity to handle 20 million TEUs – about thirty times the 2014 throughput of Dar es 
Salaam (TPA, 2015). The announcement in 2013 served to escalate further the “space race” 
with the Kenyan government, which by then had stated its intention to build a USD 13 billion 
mega-port in Lamu. President Kikwete ventured to lay the foundation stone of the Bagamoyo 
port during the electoral campaign of 2015; his successor Magufuli shelved the project three 
months later, postponing the start of construction to 2017.  
 
                                                          
19 This is not to deny that infrastructural projects, such as the extension of Dar port or plans for the mega-port in Bagamoyo, 
are also about gaining access to government contracts and rewarding patron-client networks. This was evident, for example, 
in the sacking of the TPA’s top management and the disbanding of its board by President Magufuli in December 2015 on 
corruption charges. It is rather that clientelist patterns of resource distribution cannot tell the whole story.  
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The project of modernity represented by Bagamoyo, albeit contested by a fraction of the 
political elites, operates by means of a twofold movement. On the one hand, its promoters 
tarnish the existing port of Dar, and deprecates it as old and un-modern, treating in interviews 
old infrastructures, personnel and practices as superfluous, even troublesome clutter that cannot 
be modernized. This provides the foundation for the second movement: presenting the 
inescapable need for a new port to be built from scratch. Thus, in the interim between 2013 and 
2015, public authorities had enthusiastically embraced the prospect of the new port in an 
undeveloped location as the durable solution to the problems of space within the port and of 
congestion around it. Interestingly for the analysis in hand, imaginaries of modernity 
recurrently surfaced in the controversies about the Bagamoyo project.20 Powerful narratives of 
hope permeated port reforms, suggesting that notions of ‘unreconstructed modernism’ 
(Abbink, 2012) still instigate and legitimate large-scale infrastructure projects. 
 
Apart from the World Bank narrative of the port as gateway to economic growth, these hopes 
are centred around distinct “economies of anticipation” (Cross, 2015) attached to a ‘Dubai 
model’. The Tanzanian president stated in 2014: ‘If we invest in logistic centres, improve on 
infrastructure and create a facilitative environment, we can easily turn Dar es Salaam into 
another Dubai of its kind’.21 This idea was then adhered to the new Bagamoyo mega-project. 
The content of this Dubai model remained rather vague, but included what Chorin (2010) refers 
to as the standard use of the term: to emulate Dubai’s exceptional development including its 
logistics facilities (despite Dubai’s unique circumstances). Cowen’s (2014) work on the Dubai 
Logistics City indeed strongly resonates with the narratives underpinning the Bagamoyo 
scheme: the seamlessness that the Dubai Logistics City so aptly epitomizes underpins the 
Bagamoyo project as the enactment of a new, exceptional zone of development in the vicinity 
of Dar es Salaam. So far, only feasibility studies and initial construction work have been 
undertaken. Indeed, people have been resettled from the Mbegani area.22 While difficult to 
                                                          
20 ‘From scratch’ would of course only be partly true as Bagamoyo district hosts one of the oldest ports on the east African 
coast - see Fabian (2007).  
21 Blair, E and Ng’wanakilala F (2014) Tanzania president maps out plan for transport hub. Reuters, 11 April, 2014. 
Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/11/us-africa-summit-tanzania-transportation-
idUSBREA3A1JN20140411 (accessed 27 May 2016). 
22 Exact figures are difficult to ascertain. Tanzanian newspapers cite a figure of 2,183 residents resettled AND compensated 
to date – see Mirondo, R (2016) Fate of Bagamoyo port clarified. The Citizen, 9 January, 2016. Available at 
http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Fate-of-Bagamoyo-Port-clarified/-/1840340/3026666/-/11ug0kd/-/index.html (accessed 27 
May, 2016).  
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emulate and still with a potentially uncertain future, as powerful vision, Dubai has been folded 
into Tanzanian debates over maritime transport and urban development.  
 
Conclusion  
This article looked at Dar es Salam port (and its unbuilt competitor Bagamoyo to some extent) 
as a window onto new political geographies of large-scale economic infrastructures. It argued 
for drawing on political topography and topology for a ‘topolographical’ methodology in order 
to capture processes of making flow, and fixing, which together make up contemporary 
political geographies of infrastructure hubs. Instead of treating them as irreconcilable 
ontological traditions, we argue for complimentary synthesis to adequately understand flows 
as imbued with claims to power and authority, and fluid potential for change as embedded in 
moorings on which flows very much rely. While infrastructures of logistics encapsulate ideas 
of mobility, their geography crucially includes topological and topographical technologies of 
security, exclusion and exploitation.  
In this regard we argued that political topography draws attention to where the port is and who 
is afforded authority over its surface space, but that there is more to the respacing of political 
geographies than this captures. Drawing on the literature on political topology, other 
dimensions matter, such as the projection of power across distance, and the drawing close of 
distant others independent from formal authority and physical presence. Two key devised do 
this work: imaginaries associated with infrastructure, and technical devices. Both are actively 
involved in the politics of infrastructure, opening up possibilities while making other courses 
of action less likely. Building on this combined heuristic, it was shown how Dar port evolved 
into an archipelago of territorialities that transcends well beyond its traditional boundaries; and 
that relations that reproduce territorial authority mutated over time and became dispersed and 
graduated between various state agents and petty bureaucrats, international organisations and 
logistics, shipping and other multinational companies. As such, authority has become dispersed 
and exercised via intermediaries, most importantly commercial operators.  
However, thinking through political topology revealed important dimensions of a 
reconfiguration of political geographies traditional political topography fails to capture. First, 
a project of the topological compression shaped the very political topography of Dar port. 
Imageries of the port moved from port-as-checkpoint to ‘gateway’. Together with rankings that 
benchmarked Dar against other ports, these drew distant places closer to Dar and made the 
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concerns of distant others felt more keenly in the port and shape port reforms. In addition, 
technical devices were crucial in constituting the port as part of technological zones in which 
the exercise of power is diffuse and hides itself as it works via seemingly a-political standards 
and technology. Finally, the controversy over the refurbishment of Dar port versus building a 
new mega-port at Bagamoyo illustrated how large-scale economic infrastructure cannot be 
understood without due consideration of new topologies of anticipation of modernity. Hugely 
understudied, in Dar these do not revolve around a Western model but fold a Dubai City 
inspired aspiration to development into the politics of infrastructure. The idea of a ‘Dubai 
model’ here was mobilized for plans to build ‘modernity from scratch’ where once the old slave 
port of Bagamoyo was.  
 
Large-scale economic infrastructures are indeed crucial entry points for making the workings 
of ‘global’ politics more visible, and for capturing future spatialities of zones and (channelled) 
flows. The ‘topolographical’ methodology suggested here addresses precisely the intersection 
of the production of territories and flows, and the power topographies and topologies making 
these possible. Much work is ahead to scrutinize and understand the contentious re-spacing of 
political geographies around large-scale economic infrastructures.  
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